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III.

RIGHTS CLAIMED BY LITTORAL STATES IN
ADJACENT SEAS

1. The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), International Court
of Justice, Judgment of 9 April 1949
NoTE. On 22 October 1946 two British destroyers, the Saumarez andVolage,
while navigating within Albanian territorial waters in the North Corfu Channel,
struck mines and were seriously damaged, with heavy loss of life. On 13 November 1946 British minesweepers swept the area where the incident had occurred, and recovered some mines. After having tried unsuccessfully to obtain
an apology and compensation from Albania through diplomatic channels, the
Government of the United Kingdom brought the dispute to the attention of the
Security Council of the United Nations by a letter of 10 January 1947. By a
res~lution of 9 April 1947, the Security Council recommended "that the United
Kingdom and the Albanian Government should immediately refer the dispute to
the lnterna tional Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the
Statute of the Court." Security Council, Official Records, Second Year, No.
34, pp. 726-727.
Proceedings were instituted before the Court by an application of the Government of the United Kingdom on 22 May 1947. By a letter of 2 July 1947 the
Albanian Government stated that it accepted the recommendation of the Security
Council and accepted "the Court's jurisdiction ·for this case." By a judgment
of 25 March 1948, the Court rejected a preliminary objection by Albania and
held that it had jurisdiction of the case. I. C. J. Reports 1948, p. 15. Immediately after the delivery of this judgment the parties notified the Court that
they had concluded a special agreement submitting two questions to the Court
for decision. The Court handed down a judgment on the merits on 9 April
1949; on the same day it issued an order setting time limits for submission of the
parties' observations concerning the assessment of the amount of compensation
due from Albania. I. C. J. Reports 1949, p. 171.
(International Court of Justice Reports, 1949, pp. 4-169.)

Present: Acting President Guerrero; President
Basdevant; Judges Alvarez, Fabela, Hackworth,
Winiarski, Zoricic, De Visscher, Sir Arnold MeN air,
Klaestad, Badawi Pasha, Krylov, Read, Hsu Mo,
Azevedo; M. Ecer, Judge ad hoc.
In the Corfu Channel case, between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, represented by:
Sir Eric Beckett, K. C. M. G., K. C.; Legal
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Adviser to the Foreign Office, as Agent and Counsel
assisted by
The Right Honourable Sir Hartley Shawcross,
K. C., M.P., Attorney-General, replaced on November 15th, 1948, by
Sir Frank Soskice, K. C., M.P., Solicitor-General;
Mr. C. H. M. Waldock, Professor of international
law in the University of Oxford,
Mr. R. 0. Wilberforce,
Mr. J. Mervyn Jones, and
Mr. M. E. Reed (of the Attorney-General's
Office), members of the English Bar, as Counsel, and
The Government of the People's Republic of
Albania, rep res en ted by:
M. Kahreman Ylli, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania in Paris, as
Agent, replaced on February 14th, 1949, by
M. Behar Shtylla, Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania in Paris, assisted
by
M. Pierre Cot. Professeur agrege of the Fac~lties
of Law of France, and
Maitre Joe Nordmann, of the Paris Bar, as Counsel; and
Maitre Marc J acquier, of the Paris Bar, and
Maitre Paul Villard, of the Paris Bar, as
Advocates.
THE CouRT, composed as above, delivers the
following judgment:
By a Judgment delivered on March 25th, 1948
(I. C. J. Reports 1947-1948, p. 15), in the Corfu
Channel case, in proceedings instituted on May
22nd, 1947, by an application of the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland against the Government of the People's
Republic of Albania, the Court gave its decision on
the PrE~liminary Objection filed on December 9th,
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1947, by the latter Government. The Court rejected
the Objection and decided that proceedings on the
merits should continue, and fixed the time-limits for
the filing of subsequent pleadings as follows: for the
Counter-Memorial of Albania: June 15th, 1948; for
the Reply of the United Kingdom: August 2nd,
1948; for the Rejoinder of Albania: September 20th,
1948.
Immediately after the delivery of the judgment,
the Court was notified by the Agents of the Parties
of a Special Agreement, which is as follows:
The Government of the People's Republic of Albania, represented by their Agent Mr. Kahreman Ylli, Envoy Extraordinary
and, Minister Plenipotentiary of Albania at Paris;
and
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, represented by their Agent, Mr. W. E.
Beckett, C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office;
Have accepted the present Special Agreement, which has been
drawn up as a result of the Resolution of the Security Council of
the 9th April, 1947, for the purpose of submitting to the International Court of Justice for decision the following questions:
(1) Is Albania responsible under international law for the
explosion which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life
which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay
compensation?
(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law
violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic
by reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters
on the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November
1946 and is there any duty to give satisfaction?
The Parties agree that the present Special Agreement shall be
notified to the In tern a tiona! Court of Justice immediately after
the delivery on the 25th March of its judgment on the question
of jurisdiction.
The Parties request the Court, having regard to the present
Special Agreement, to 1nake such orders with regard to procedure, in conformity with the Statute and the Rules of the
Court, as the Court may deem fit, after having consulted the
Agents of the Parties.
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In witness whereof the above-mentioned Agents, being duly
authorized by their Government to this effect, have signed the
present Special Agreement.
Done this 25th day of March, 1948, at midday, at The Hague,
in English and French, both texts being equally authentic, in a
single copy which shall be deposited with the International
Court of Justice.

On March 26th, 1948 (I. C. J. Reports 1947-1948,
p. 53), the Court made an Order in which it placed
on record that the Special Agreement now formed
the basis of further proceedings before the Court,
and stated the questions submitted to it for decision.
The Court noted that the United Kingdom Government, on October 1st, 1947, th at is within the timelimit fixed by the Court, had filed a Memorial with
statements and submissions relating to the incident
that occurred on October 22nd, 1946. It further
noted that the Agents, having been consulted, declared that they agreed in requesting that the order
and time-limits for the filing of the subsequent
pleadings as fixed by the Judgment of March 25th,
1948, be maintained. The Court confirmed this
order and these time-limits.
The Counter-Memorial, Reply and Rejoinder were
filed within these limits. The case was thus ready
for hearing on September 20th, 1948, and the commencement of the oral proceedings was then fixed
for November 5th, 1948.
As the Court did not include upon the Bench a
judge of Albanian nationality, the Albanian Government availed itself during the proceedings on the
Preliminary Objection of the right provided by
Article 31, paragraph 2, of the Statute, and chose
M. Igor Daxner, Doctor of Law, President of a
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia,
as Judge ad hoc. On October 28th, 1948, the Registrar was informed that Judge Daxner was
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prevented by reasons of health from sitting on the date
fixed. The Court decided on November 2nd, 1948,
to fix a time-limit expiring on November 7th, within
which the Albanian Government might notify the
name of the person whom it wished to choose as
Judge ad hoc in place of Dr. Daxner, and to postpone the opening of the hearing until November 9th,
Within the time fixed the Albanian Government
designated M. Bohuslav Ecer, Doctor of Law and
Professor in the Faculty of Law at Brno, and delegate of the Czechoslovak Government to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
Public sittings were held by the Court on the
following dates: November, 1948, 9th to 12th, 15th
to 19th, 22nd to 26th, 28th and 29th; December,
1948, 1st to 4th, 6th to 11th, 13th, 14th and 17th;
January, 1949, 17th to 22nd. In the course of the
sittings from November 9th to 19th, 1948, and from
January 17th to 22nd, 1949, the Court heard arguments by Sir Hartley Shawcross, K. C., Counsel,
Sir Eric Beckett, K. C., Agent and Counsel, and
Sir Frank Soskice, K. C., Counsel, on behalf of the
United Kingdom; and by M. Kahreman Ylli, Agent,
and MM. J. Nordmann and Pierre Cot, Counsel,
on behalf of Albania. In the course of the sittings
from November 22nd to December 14th, 1948, the
Court heard the evidence of the witnesses and experts
called by each of the Parties in reply to questions
put to them in examination and cross-examination
on behalf of the Parties, and by the President on
behalf of the Court or by a Member of the Court.
The following persons gave evidence:

Called by the United Kingdom:
Commander E. R. D. Sworder, O.B.E., D.S.C.,
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, as witness and
expert;
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Karel Kovacic, former Lieutenant-Comrnander in
the Yugoslav Navy, as witness;
Captain W. H. Selby, D.S.C., Royal Navy, as
witness;
Commander R. T. Paul, C.B.E., Royal Navy, as
witness;
Lieutenant-Commander P. K. Lankester, Royal
Navy, as witness and expert;
Commander R. Mestre, French Navy, as witness;
CommanderQ. P. Whitford, O.B.E., Royal Navy,
as witness and expert;

Called by Albania:
Captain Ali Shtino, Albanian Army, as witness;
First Captain Aquile Polena, Albanian Army, as
witness;
Xhavit Mu\=o, former Vice-President of the Executive Committee of Saranda, as witness;
Captain B. I. Ormanov, Bulgarian Navy, as
expert.
Rear-Admiral Raymond Moullec, French Navy,
as expert.
Documents, including maps, photographs and
sketches, were filed by both Parties, and on one
occasion by the Parties jointly, both as annexes to
the pleadings, and after the close of the written
proceedings. On one occasion during the sittings
when a photostat of an extract from a document
was submitted, the Court, on November 24th, 1948,
mad-e a decision in which it reminded both Parties
of the provisions of Article 48 and Article 43, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court; held that the document in question could be received only if it were
presented in an original and complete form; ordered
that all documents which the Parties intended to
use should previously be filed in the Registry; and
reserved the right to inform the Parties later which
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of these documents should be presented in an
original, and which in certified true copy, form.
Another decision as to the production of a series
of new documents was given by the Court on December lOth, 1948. This decision noted that the Parties
were agreed as to the production of certain of these
documents and that certain others were withdrawn;
authorized the production of certain other documents; lastly, in the case of one of these .documents,
the examination of which had been subjected to
certain conditions, the Court's decision placed on
record the consent of the other Party to its production and, in view of that consent, permitted its
production, having regard to the special circumstances; but the Court expressly stated that this
1
permission could not form a precedent for the future •
By an Order of December 17th, 1948, the Court,
having regard to the fact that certain points had
been contested between the Parties which made it
necessary to obtain an expert opinion, defined these
points, and entrusted the duty of giving the expert
opinion to a Committee composed of Commodore
J. Bull of the Royal Norwegian Navy, Commodore
S. A. Forshell of the Royal Swedish Navy, and
Lieutenant-CommanderS. J. W Elfferich of the Royal
Netherlands Navy. These Experts elected Commodore Bull as their chairman, and filed their
Report on January 8th, 1949, within the prescribed
time-limit. By a decision read at a public sitting
on January 17th, the Court requested the Experts
to proceed to Sibenik in Yugoslavia and Saranda in
Albania and to make on the land and in the waters
adjacent to these places any investigations and
experiments that they might consider useful with a
view to verifying, completing, and, if mecessary,
modifying the answers given in their report of
Janu a ry 8th. The Experts' second report-in which
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Commodore Bull did not join, having been unable
to make the journey for reasons of health-was filed
on February 8th, 1949. On February lOth, three
members of the Court put questions to the Experts,
to which the Experts replied on February 12th.
At sittings held from January 17th to 22nd, 1949,
the representatives of the Parties had an opportunity
of commenting orally on the Experts' report of
2
January 8th. They also filed written observations
concerning the further statements contained in the
Report of February 8th and the replies of February
12th, as provided in the Court's decision of January
17th.
The Parties' submissions, as formulated by their
Agents or Counsel at the end of the hearings on the
18th, 19th, 21st and 22nd January, 1949, are as
follows:

Question (1) of the Special Agreement.
On behalf of the United Kingdom:
The Government of the United Kingdom asks the Court in
this case to adjudge and declare as follows:
(1) That, on October 22nd, 1946, damage was caused to His
Majesty's ships Saun1arez and Volage, which resulted in the
death and injuries of 44, and personal injuries to 42, British
officers and men by a minefield of anchored automatic mines
in the international highway of the Corfu Strait in an area
south-west of the Bay of Saranda;
(2) That the aforesaid minefield was laid between May 15th
and October 22nd, 1946, by or with the connivance or knowledge
of the Albanian Government;
(3) That (alternatively to 2) the Albanian Government knew
that the said minefield was lying in a part of its territorial waters;
(4) That the Albanian Government did not notify the existence of these mines as required by the Hague Convention VIII
1

The list of documents in support produced by the Parties and accepted by
the Court will be found in Annex 1 to this Judgment.
2
See Annex 2 for the Experts' Report of January 8th, the Court's decision of
January 17th, the Experts' second Report of February 8th, the questions put by
three members of the Court, and the Experts' replies of February 12th.
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of 1907 in accordance with the general principle of international
law and humanity;
(5) That in addition, and as an aggravation of the conduct of
Albania as set forth in Conclusions (3) and (4), the Albanian
Government, or its agents, knowing that His Majesty's ships
were going to make the passage through the North Corfu swept
channel, and being in a position to observe their approach, and
having omitted, as alleged in paragraph 4 of these conclusions
to notify the existence of the said mines, failed to warn His
Majesty's ships of the danger of the said mines of which the
Albanian Government or its agents were well aware;
(6) That in addition, and as a further aggravation of the conduct of Albania as set forth in Conclusions (3), (4), and (5), the
permission of the existence without notification of the minefield
in the North Corfu Channel, being an international highways
was a violation of the right of innocent passage which exist,
in favour of foreign vessels (whether warships or merchant
ships) through such an international highway;
(7) That the passage of His Majesty's ships through the North
Corfu Channel on October 22nd, 1946, was an exercise of the
right of innocent passage, according to the law and practice of
civilized nations;
(8) That even if, for any reason, it is held that conclusion (7)
is not established, nevertheless, the Albanian Government is not
thereby relieved of its international responsibility for the damage
caused to the ships by reason of the existence of an unnotified
minefield of which it had knowledge;
(9) That in the circumstances set forth in the Memorial as
summarized in the preceding paragraphs of these Conclusions,
the Albanian Government has committed a breach of its obligations under international law, and is internationally responsible
to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the
deaths, injuries and damage caused to His Majesty's ships and
personnel, as set out more particularly in paragraph 18 of the
Memorial and the Annexes thereto;
(10) That the Albanian Government is under an obligation to
the Government of the United Kingdom to make reparation in
respect of the breach of its international obligations as aforesaid;
(11) That His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
.has, as a result of the breach by the Albanian Government of its
obligations under international law, sustained the following
damage:
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Damage to H .M .S . Saumare z .... ............................ . £ 750,000
75,000
Damage to H.M.S. Volage .. ................................. .
Compensation for the pensions and other expenses incurred by the
Government of the United Kingdom in respect of the deaths and
50,000
injuries of naval personnel ............. . .. . ......... . ....... .

875,000

On behalf of the Albanian Government:
[Translation.]
(1) Under the terms of the Special Agreement of March 25th,
1948, the following question has been submitted to the International Court of Justice:
c Is Albania responsible under international law for the explosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in
Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of human life
which resulted from them and is there any duty to pay
compensation?'
The Court would not have jurisdiction, in virtue of this
Special Agreement, to decide, if the case arose, on the claim
for the assessment of the compensation set out in the submissions of the United Kingdom Government.
(2) It has not been proved that the mines which caused the
accidents of October 22nd, 1946, were laid by Albania.
(3) It has not been prov:~d that these mines vvere laid by a
third Power on behalf of Albania.
(4) It has not been proved that these mines were laid with the
help or acquiescence of Albania.
(5) It has not been proved that Albania knew, before the
incidents of October 22nd, 1946, that these mines were in her
terri to rial waters.
(6) Consequently, Albania cannot be declared responsible,
under international law, for the explosions which occurred on
October 22nd, 1946, in Albanian W"aters, and for the damage
and loss of human life which resulted from them. Albania
owes no compensation to the United Kingdom Government.

Question (2) of the Special Agreement.
On behalf of the Albanian Government:
[Translation.]
(1) Under the terms of the Special Agreement concluded on
March 25th, 1948, the International Court of Justice has before
it the following question:
Has the United Kingdom under international law violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by
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reason of the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on
the 22nd October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946,
and is there any duty to give satisfaction?
(2) The coastal State is entitled, in exceptional circumstances,
to regulate the passage of foreign warships through its territorial
waters.
(3) This rule is applicable to the North Carfu Channel.
(4) In October and November, 1946, there existed, in this
area, exceptional circumstances which gave the Albanian
Government the right to require that foreign warships should
obtain previous authorization before passing through its territorial waters.
(5) The passage of several British warships through Albanian
territorial waters on October 22nd, 1946, ·without previous
authorization, constituted a breach of international law.
(6) In any case that passage was not of an innocent character.
(7) The British naval authorities were not entitled to proceed
on November 12th and 13th, 1946, to sweep mines in Albanian
territorial waters without the previous consent of the Albanian
authorities.
(8) The Court should find that, on both these occasions, the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland committed a breach of the rules of international law and that the Albanian Government has a right to
demand that it should give satisfaction therefor."

On behalf of the United Kingdom Government:
I ask the Court to decide that on neither head of the counterclaim has Albania made out her case, and that there is no ground
for the Court to award nominal damages of one farthing or one
franc.

*

*

*

*

*

By the first part of the Special Agreement, the
following question is submitted to the Court:
(1) Is Albania responsible under international law for the
explosions which occurred on the 22nd October 1946 in Albanian
waters and for the damage and loss of human life which resulted
from them and is there any duty to pay con1pensation?

On October 22nd, 1946, a squadron of British
warships, the cruisers Mauritius and Leander and
the destroyers Saumarez and Volage, left the port of
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Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel
previously swept for mines in the North Corfu Strait.
The cruiser Mauritius was leading, followed by the
destroyer Saumarez; at a certain distance thereafter
came the cruiser Leander followed by the destroyer
Volage. Outside the Bay of Saranda, Saumarez
struck a mine and was heavily damaged. Volage
was ordered to give her assistance and to take her
in tow. Whilst towing the damaged ship, Volage
struck a mine and was much damaged. Nevertheless, she succeeded in towing the other ship back
to Corfu.
Three weeks later, on November 13th, the North
Corfu Channel was swept by British minesweepers
and twenty-two moored mines were cut. Two
mines were taken· to Malta for expert examination.
During the minesweeping operations it was thought
that the mines were of the German GR type, but
it was subsequently established that they were of
the German GY type.
The Court will consider first whether the two
explosions that occurred on October 22nd, 1946,
were caused by mines belonging to the minefield
discovered on November 13th.
It was pointed out on behalf of the United Kingdom Government that this minefield had been
recently laid. This was disputed in the Albanian
pleadings but was no longer disputed during the
hearing. One of the Albanian Counsel expressly
recognized that the minefield had been recently laid,
and the other Counsel subsequently made a similar
declaration. It was further asserted on behalf of
the Albanian Government that the minefield must
have been laid after October 22nd; this would make
it impossible at the same time to maintain that the
minefield was old. The documents produced by the
United Kingdom Government and the statements

120
made by the Court's Experts and based on these
documents show that the minefield had been recently
laid. This is now established.
The United Kingdom Government contended that
the mines which struck the two ships on October
22nd were part of this minefield.
This was contested by the Albanian Government,
which argued that these mines may have been floating
mines, coming from old minefields in the vicinity,
or magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines,
or German GR mines. It was also contested by
them that the explosions occurred in the previously
swept channel at the place where the minefield was
discovered. The Albanian Government also contended that the minefield was laid after October
22nd, between that date and the minesweeping
operation on 12-13th November.
On the evidence produced, the Court finds that
the following facts are established:
In October, 1944, the North Corfu Ch·annel was
swept by the British Navy and no mines were found
in the channel thus swept, whereupon the existence
of a safe route through the Channel was announced
in November 1944. In January and February, 1945,
the Channel was check-swept by the British Navy
with negative results. That the British Admiralty
must have considered the Channel to be a safe route
for navigation is shown by the fact that on May 15th,
1946, it sent two British cruisers and on October
22nd a squadron through the Channel without any
special measures of precaution against danger from
moored mines. It was in this swept channel that
the minefield was discovered on November 13th,
1946.
It is further proved by evidence produced by the
United Kingdom Government that the mining of
Saumarez and Volage occurred in Albanian territorial
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waters, just at the place in the swept channel where
the minefield was found, as indica ted on the chart
forming Annex 9 to the United Kingdom Memorial.
This is confirmed by the Court's Experts, who consider it to be free from any doubt that the two ships
were mined in approximately the position indicated
on this chart.
It is established by the evidence of witnesses that
the minefield consisted of moored con tact mines of
the German GY type. It is further shown by the
nature of the damage sustained by the two ships,
and confirmed by witnesses and experts, that it
could not have been caused by floating mines, magnetic ground mines, magnetic moored mines, or
German GR mines. The experts of the Court have
stated that the nature of the damage excludes the
faintest possibility of its cause being a floating mine;
nor could it have been caused by a ground mine.
They also expressed the view that the damage must
have been caused by the explosion of moored contact
mines, each having a charge of approximately 600 lbs.
of explosives, and that the two ships struck mines
of the same type as those which were swept on
November 13th, 1946.
The Albanian Government put forward a suggestion that the minefield discovered on November
13th may have been laid after October 22nd, so
that the explosions that occurred on this latter date
would not have been caused by mines from the field
in question. But it brought no evidence in support
of this supposition. As it has been established that
the explosions could only have been due to moored
mines having an explosive charge similar to that
contained in GY mines, there would, if the Albanian
contention were true, have been at least two mines
of this nature in the channel outside the Bay of
Saranda, in spite of the sweep in October 1944 and
855422-50-9

122
the check-sweeps in January and February 1945;
and these mines would have been struck by the two
vessels at points fairly close to one another on
October 22nd, 1946. Such a supposition is too improbable to be accepted.
The Court consequently finds that the following
facts are established. The two ships were mined
in Albanian territorial waters in a previously swept
and check-swept channel just at the place where a
newly laid minefield consisting of moored contact
German GY mines was discovered three weeks later.
The damage sustained by the ships was inconsistent
with damage which could have been caused by
floating mines, magnetic ground mines, magnetic
moored mines, or German GR mines, but its nature
and extent were such as would be caused by mines
of the type found in the minefield. In such circumstances the Court arrives at the conclusion that the
explosions were due to mines belonging to that
minefield.

*

*

*

*

*

Such are the facts upon which the Court must, in
order to reply to the first question of the Special
Agreement, give judgment as to Albania's responsibility for the explosions on October 22nd, 1946,
and for the damage and loss of human life which
resulted, and for the compensation, if any, due in
respect of such damage and loss.
To begin with, the foundation for Albania's responsibility, as alleged by the United Kingdom, must
be considered. On this subject, the main position
of the United Kingdom is to be found in its submission No. 2: that the minefield which caused the explosions was laid between May 15th, 1946, and
October 22nd, 1946, by or with the connivance or
knowledge of the Albanian Government.
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The Court considered first the various grounds
for responsibility alleged in this submission.
In fact, although the United Kingdom Government never abandoned its contention that Albania
herself laid the mines, very little attempt was made
by the Government to demonstrate this point. In
the written Reply, the United Kingdom Government
takes note of the Albanian Government's formal
statement that it did not lay the mines, and was not in
a position to do so, as Albania possessed no navy;
and that, on the whole Albanian littoral, the Albanian
authorities only had a few launches and motor boats.
In the light of these statements, the Albanian Government was called upon, in the Reply, to disclose
the circumstances in which two Yugoslav war
vessels, the Mljet and the M eljine, carrying contact
mines of the GY type, sailed southward from the
port of Sibenik on or about October 18th, and proceeded to the Corfu Channel. The United Kingdom
Government, having thus indicated the argument
upon which it was thenceforth to concentrate, stated
that it proposed to show that the said warships, with
the knowledge and connivance of the Albanian Government, laid mines in the Corfu Channel just before
October 22nd, 1946. The facts were presented in
the same light and in the same language in the oral
reply by Counsel for the United Kingdom Government at the sittings on January 17th and 18th, 1949.
Although the suggestion that the minefield was
laid"by Albania was repeated in the United Kingdom
statement in Court on January 18th, 1949, and in
the final submissions read in Court on the same day,
this suggestion was in fact hardly put forward at
that time except pro memoria, and no evidence in
support was furnished.
In these circumstances, the Court need pay no
further attention to this rna tter.
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The Court now comes to the second alternative
argument of the United Kingdom Government,
namely, that the minefield was laid with the connivance of the Alba.nian Government. According
to this argument, the minelaying operation was
carried out by two Yugoslav warships at a date prior
to October 22nd, but very near that date. This
would imply collusion between the Albanian and
the Yugoslav Governments, consisting either of a
request by the Albanian Government to the Yugoslav
Government for assistance, or of acquiescence by the
Albanian authorities in the laying of the mines.
In proof of this collusion, the United Kingdom
Government relied on the evidence of LieutenantCommander Kovacic, as shown in his affidavit of
October 4th, 1948, and in his statements in Court
at the public sittings on November 24th, 25th, 26th
and 27th, 1948. The Court gave much attention to
this evidence and to the documentary information
supplied by the Parties. It supplemented and
checked all this information by sending two experts
appointed by it to Sibenik: CommodoreS. A. Forshell
and Lieutenant-CommanderS.]. W. Elfferich.
Without deciding as to the personal sincerity of
the witness Kovacic, or the truth of what he said,
the Court finds that the facts stated by the witness
from his personal knowledge are not sufficient .to
prove what the United Kingdom Government considered them to prove. His allegations that he saw
mines being loaded upon two Yugoslav minesweepers
at Sibenik and that these two vessels departed from
Sibenik about October 18th and returned a few days
after the occurrence of the explosions do not suffice
to constitute decisive legal proof that the mines were
laid by these two vessels in Albanian waters off
Saranda. The statements attributed by the witness
Kovacic to third parties, of which the Court has
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received no personal and direct confirmation, can
be regarded only as allegations falling short of conclusive evidence. A charge of such exceptional
gravity against a State would require a degree of
certainty that has not been reached here.
Apart from Kovacic's evidence, the United Kingdom Government endeavoured to prove collusion
between Albania and Yugoslavia by certain presumptions of fact, or circumstantial evidence, such
as the possession, at that time, by Yugoslavia, and
by no other neighbouring State, of GY mines, and
by the bond of close political and military alliance
between Albania and Yugoslavia, resulting from the
Treaty of friendship and mutual assistance signed
by those two States on July 9th, 1946.
The Court considers that, even in so far as these
facts are established, they lead to no firm conclusion.
It has not been legally established that Yugoslavia
possessed any GY mines, and the origin of the mines
laid in Albanian territorial waters remains a matter
for conjecture. It is clear that the existence of a
treaty, such as that of July 9th, 1946, however close
may be the bonds uniting its signatories, in no way
leads to the conclusion that they participated in a
criminal act.
On its side, the Yugoslav Government, although
not a party to the proceedings, authorized the
Albanian Government to produce certain Yugoslav
documents, for the purpose of refuting the United
Kingdom contention that the mines had been laid
by two ships of the Yugoslav Navy. As the Court
was anxious for full light to be thrown on the facts
alleged, it did not refuse to receive these doc;uments.
But Yugoslavia's absence from the proceedings
meant that these documents could only be admitted
as evidence subject to reserves, and the Court· finds

126
it unnecessary to express an op1n1on upon their
probative value.
The Court need not dwell on the assertion of one
of the Counsel for the Albanian Government that
the minefield might have been laid by the Greek
Government. It is enough to say that this was a
mere conjecture which, as Counsel himself admitted,
was based on no proof.
In the light of the information now a vail able to
the Court, the authors of the minelaying remain
unknown. In any case, the task of the Court, as
defined by the Special Agreement, is to decide
whether Albania is responsible, under international
law, for the explosions which occurred on October
22nd, 1946, and to give judgment as to the compensation, if any.
Finally, the United Kingdom Government put
forward the argument that, whoever the authors of
the minelaying were, it could not have been done
without the Albanian Government's knowledge.
It is clear that knowledge of the minela ying cannot
be imputed to the Albanian Government by reason
merely of the fact that a minefield discovered in
Albanian territorial waters caused the explosions of
which the British warships were the victims. It is
true, as international practice shows, that a State on
whose territory or in whose waters an act contrary
to international law has occurred, may be called
upon to give an explanation. It is also true that
that State cannot evade such a request by limiting
itself to a reply that it is ignorant of the circumstances of the act and of its authors. The State
may, up to a certain point, be bound to supply
particulars of the use made by it of the means of
information and inquiry at its disposal. But it cannot be concluded from the mere fact of the control
exercised by a State over its territory and waters
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that that State necessarily knew , or ought to have
known, of any unlawful act perpetrated therein , nor
yet that it necessarily knew, or should have known,
the authors. This fact, by itself and apart from
other circumstances, neither involves prima facie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.
On the other hand, the fact of this exclusive territorial control exercised by a State within its frontiers
has a bearing upon the methods of proof available
to establish the knowledge of that State as to such
events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other
State, the victim of a breach of international law, is
often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving
rise to responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact
and circumstantial evidence. This indirect evidence
is admitted in all systems of law, and its use is recognized by international decisions. It must be regarded as of special weight when it is based on a
series of facts linked together and leading logically
to a single conclusion.
The Court must examine therefore whether it has
been established by means of indirect evidence that
Albania has knowledge of minelaying in her territorial waters independently of any connivance on her
part in this operation. The proof may be drawn
from inferences of fact, provided that they leave no
room for reasonable doubt. The elements of fact on
which these inferences can be based may differ from
those which are relevant to _ the question of connivance.
In the present case, two series of facts, which
corroborate ·one another, have to be considered: the
first relates to Albania's attitude before and after
the disaster of October 22nd, 1946; the other concerns
the feasibility of observing minelaying from the
Albanian coast.
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1. It is clearly established that the Albanian
Government constantly kept a close watch over the
waters of the North Corfu Channel, at any rate after
May 1946. This vigilance is proved by the declaration of the Albanian Delegate in the Security Council
on February 19th, 1947 (Official Records of the Security Council, Second Year, No. 16, p. 328), and
especially by the diplomatic notes of the Albanian
Government concerning the passage of foreign ships
through its territorial waters. This vigilance sometimes went so far as to involve the use of force: for
example the gunfire in the direction of the British
cruisers Orion and Superb on May 15th, 1946, and
the shots fired at the U.N.R.R.A. tug and barges on
October 29th, 1946, as established by the affidavit
Enrico Bargellini, which was not seriously contested.
The Albanian Government's notes are all evidence
of its intention to keep a jealous watch on its territorial waters. The note verb ale addressed to the
United Kingdom on May 21st, 1946, reveals the
existence of a "General Order", in execution of which
the Coastal Commander gave the order to fire in
the direction of the British cruisers. This same
note formulates a demand that "permission" shall
be given, by the Albanian authorities, for passage
through terri to rial waters. The insistence on "formalities" and "permission" by Albania is repeated
in the Albanian note of June 19th.
As the Parties agree that the minefield had been
recently laid, it must be concluded that the operation
was carried out during the period of close watch by
the Albanian authorities in this sector. This conclusion renders the Albanian Government's assertion
of ignorance a priori somewhat improbable.
The Court also noted the reply of Captain Ali
Shtino to a question put by it; this reply shows that
the witness, who had been called on to replace the
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Coastal Defence Commander for a period of thirteen
to fifteen days, immediately before the events of
October 22nd, had received the following order:
"That the look-out posts must inform me of every
movement [in the Corfu Channel], and that no action
would be taken on our part."
The telegrams sent by the Albanian Government
on November 13th and November 27th, 1946, to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at a
time when that Government was fully aware of the
discovery of the minefield in Albanian territorial
waters, are especially significant of the measures
taken by the Albanian Government. In the first
telegram, that Government raised the strongest protest against the movements and actibity of British
naval units in its territorial waters on November 12th
and 13th, 1946, without even mentioning the existence of a minefield in these waters. In the second,
it repeats its accusations against the United Kingdom, without in any way protesting against the laying of this minefield which, if effected without
Albania's consent, constituted a very serious violation
of her sovereignty.
Another indication of the Albanian Government's
knowledge consists in the fact that that Government
did not notify the presence of mines in its waters, at
the moment when it must have known this, at the
latest after the sweep on November 13th, and further,
wh~reas the Greek Government immediately appointed a Commission to inquire into the events of
October 22nd, the Albanian Government took no
decision of such a nature, nor did it proceed to the
judicial investigation incumbent, in such a case, on
the territorial sovereign.
This attitude does not seem reconcilable with the
alleged ignorance of the Albanian authorities that
the minefield had been laid in Albanian territorial
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waters. It could be explained if the Albanian Government, while knowing of the minelaying, desired
the circumstances of the operation to remain secret.
2. As regards the possibility of observing minelaying from the Albanian coast, the Court regards
the following facts, relating to the technical conditions of a secret minela ying and to the Albanian
surveillance, as particularly important.
The Bay of Saranda and the channel used by shipping through the Strait are, from their geographical
configuration, easily watched; the entrance of the
bay is dominated by heights offering excellent observation points, both over the bay and over the
Strait; whilst the channel throughout is close to the
Albanian coast. The laying of a minefield in these
waters could hardly fail to have been observed by
the Albanian coastal defences.
On this subject, it must first be said that the
minelaying operation itself must have required a
certain time. The method adopted required, according to the Experts of the Court, the methodical and
well thought-out laying of two rows of mines that
had clearly a combined offensive and defensive purpose: offensive, to prevent the passage, through the
Channel, of vessels drawing ten feet of water or
more; defensive, to prevent vessels of the same
draught from entering the Bay of Saranda. The
report of the Experts reckons the time that the minelayers would have been in the waters, between Cape
Kiephali and St. George's Monastery, at between
two and two and a half hours. This is sufficient
time to attract the attention of the observation posts,
placed, as the Albanian Government stated, at Cape
Kiephali and St. George's Monastery.
The facilities for . observation from the coast are
confirmed by the two following circumstances: the
distance of the nearest mine from the coast was only
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500 metres; the minelayers must have passed at not
more than about 500 metres from the coast between
Denta Point and St. George's Monastery.
Being anxious to obtain any technical information
that might guide it in its search for the truth, the
Court submitted the following question to the Experts appointed by it:
On the assumption that the mines discovered on November
13th, 1946, were laid at some date within the few preceding
months, whoever may have laid them, you are requested to examine the information available regarding (a) the number and
the nature of the mines, (b) the means for laying them, and (c)
the time required to do so, having regard to the different states
of the sea, the conditions of the locality, and the different
weather conditions, and to ascertain whether it is possible in
that way to draw any conclusions, and, if so, what conclusions,
in regard to:
(1) the means employed for laying the minefield discovered on November 13th, 1946, and
(2) the possibility of mooring those mines with those
means without the Albanian authorities being aware of it,
having regard to the extent of the 1neasures of vigilance
existing in the Saranda region.

As the first Report submitted by the Experts did
not seem entirely conclusive, the Court, by a decision
of January 17th, 1949, asked the Experts to go to
Saranda and to verify, complete and, if necessary,
modify their answers. In this way, observations
were made and various experiments carried out on
the spot, in the presence of the experts of the Parties
and" of Albanian officials, with a view to estimating
the possibility of the minelaying having been observed by the Albanian look-out posts. On this
subject reference must be made to a test of visibility
by night, carried out on the evening of January 28th,
1949, at St. George's Monastery. A motor ship, 27
metres long, and with no bridge, wheel-house, or
funnel, and very low on the water, was used. The
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ship was completely blacked out, and on a moonless
night, i.e., under the most favourable conditions for
a voiding discovery, it was clearly seen and heard
from St. George's Monastery. The noise of the
motor was heard at a distance of 1,800 metres, and
the ship itself was sigh ted at 670 metres and remained
visible up to about 1,900 metres.
The Experts Report on this visit stated that:
The Experts consider it to be indisputable that if a normal
look-out was kept at Cape Kiephali, Denta Point, and St.
George's Monastery, and if the look-outs were equipped with
binoculars as has been stated, under normal weather conditions
for this area, the minelaying operations shown in Annex 9 to the
United Kingdom Memorial must have been noticed by these
coastguards.

The Court cannot fail to give great weight to the
opinion of the Experts who examined the locality in
a manner giving every guarantee of correct and impartial information. Apart from the existence of a
look-out post at Cape Denta, which has not been
proved, the Court, basing itself on the declarations
of the Albanian Government that look-out posts were
stationed at Cape Kiephali and St. George's Monastery, refers to the following conclusions in the
Experts' Report: (1) that in the case of minelaying
from the North towards the South, the minelayers
would have been seen from Cape Kiephali; (2) in the
case of minelaying from the South, the minelayers
would have been seen from Cape Kiephali and St.
George's Monastery.
From all the facts and observations mentioned
above, the Court draws the conclusion that ·t he laying
of the minefield which caused the explosions on October 22nd, 1946, could not have been accomplished
without the knowledge of the Albanian Government.
The obligations resulting for Albania from this
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knowledge are not disputed between the Parties.
Counsel for the Albanian Government expressly
recognized that [translation] "if Albania had been informed of the operation before the incidents of
October 22nd, and in time to warn the British vessels
and shipping in general of the existence of mines in
the Corfu Channel, her responsibility would be involved . . . . ".
The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian
authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of
shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in
Albanian territorial waters and in warning the approaching British warships of the imminent danger
to which the minefield exposed them. Such obligations are based not on ·the Hague Convention of
1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in time of war,
but on certain general and well-recognized principles,
namely: elementa:t;y considerations of humanity, even
more exacting in peace than in war; the· principle of
the freedom of maritime communication; and every
State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory
to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
States.
Irt fact, Albania neither notified the existence of
the minefield, nor warned the British .warships of the
danger they were approaching.
But Albania's obligation to notify shipping of the
existence of mines in her waters depends on her having ~obtained knowledge of that fact in sufficient time
before October 22nd; and the duty of the Albanian
coastal authorities to warn the British ships depends
on the time that elapsed between the moment that
these ships were reported and the moment of the first
explosion.
On this subject, the Court makes the following
observations. As has already been stated, the Parties agree that the mines were recently laid. It must
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be concluded that the minelaying, whatever may
have been its exact date, was done at a time when
there was a close Albanian surveillance over the
Strait. If it be supposed that it took place at the
last possible moment, i.e., in the night of October
21st-22nd, the only conclusion to be drawn would
be that a general notification to the shipping of all
States before the time of the explosions would have
been difficult, perhaps even impossible. But this
would certainly not have prevented the Albanian
authorities from taking, as they should have done,
all necessary steps immediately to warn ships near
the danger zone, more especially those that were
approaching that zone. When on October 22nd
about 13.00 hours the British warships were reported
by the look-out post at St. George's Monastery to
the Commander of the Coastal Defences as approaching Cape Long, it was perfectly possible for the Albanian authorities to use the interval of almost two
hours that elapsed before the explosion affecting
Saumarez (14.53 hours or 14.55 hours) to warn the
vessels of the danger in to which they were running.
In fact, nothing was attempted by the Albanian
authorities to prevent the disaster. These grave
omissions involve the international responsibility of
Albania.
The Court therefore reaches the conclusion that
Albania is responsible under international law for the
explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in
Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of
human life which resulted from them, and that there
is a duty upon Albania to pay compensation to the
United Kingdom.

*

*

*

*

*

In the final submissions contained in its oral reply,
the United Kingdom Government asked the Court
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to give judgment that, as a result of the breach by
the Albanian Government of its obligations under
international law, it had sustained damages amounting to £875,000.
In the last oral statement submitted in its name,
the Albanian Government, for the first time, asserted
that the Court would not have jurisdiction, in virtue
of the Special Agreement to assess the amount of
compensation. No reason was given in support of
this new assertion, and the United Kingdom Agent
did not ask leave to reply. The question of the
Court's jurisdiction was not argued between the
Parties.
In the first question of the Special Agreement the
Court is asked:
(i) Is Albania under international law responsible
for the explosions and for the damage and loss of
human life which resulted from them, and
(ii) is there any duty to pay compensation?
This text gives rise to certain doubts. If point (i)
is answered in the affirmative, it follows from the
establishment of responsibility that compensation is
due, and it would be superfluous to add point (ii)
unless the Parties had something else in mind than a
mere declaration by the Court that compensation is
due. It would indeed be incompatible with the
generally accepted rules of interpretation to admit
that a provision of this sort occurring in a special
agreement should be devoid of purport or effect. In
this connexion, the Court refers to the views expressed by the Permanent Court of International
Justice with regard to similar questions of interpretation. In Advisory Opinion No. 13 of July 23rd
1926, that Court said (Series B., No. 13, p. 19):
"But, so far as concerns the specific question of competence now pending, it may suffice to observe that
the Court, in determining the nature and scope of a
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measure, must look to its practical effect rather than
to the predominant motive that may be conjectured
to have inspired it." In its Order of August 19th,
1929, in the Free Zones case, the Court said (Series
A., No. 22, p. 13): "in case of doubt, the clauses of
a special agreement by which a dispute is referred to
the Court must, if it does not involve doing violence
to their terms, be construed in a manner enabling the
clauses themselves to have appropriate effects".
The Court thinks it necessary to refer to the different stages of the procedure. In its Resolution of
April 9th, 1947, the Security Council recommended
-that the two Governments should immediately refer
"the dispute" to the Court. This Resolution had
without doubt for its aim the final adjustment of
the whole dispute. In pursuance of the Resolution,
the Government of the · United Kingdom filed an
Application in which the Court was asked, inter
alia, to "determine the reparation or compensation",
and in its Memorial that Government stated the
various sums claimed. The Albanian Government
thereupon submitted a Preliminary Objection, which
was rejected by the Court by its Judgment of March
25th, 1948. Immediately after this judgment was
delivered, the Agents of the Parties notified the Court
of the conclusion of a Special Agreement. Commenting upon this step taken by the Parties, the
Agent of the Albanian Government said that in the
circumstances of the present case a special agreement
on which "the whole procedure" should be based was
essential. He further said [translation]: "As I have
stated on several occasions, it has always been the
intention of the Albanian Government to respect the
decision taken by the Security Council on April 9th,
1947, in virtue of which the present Special Agreement is submitted to the International Court of
Justice."
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Neither the Albanian nor the United Kingdom
Agent suggested in any way that the Special Agreement had limited the competence of the Court in
this matter to a decision merely upon the principle
of compensation or that the United Kingdom Government had abandoned an important part of its
original claim. The main object both Parties had in
mind when they concluded the Special Agreement was
to establish a complete equality between them by
replacing the original procedure based on a unilateral
Application by a procedure based on a Special Agreement. There is no suggestion that this .change as
to procedure was intended to involve any change
with regard to the merits of the British claim as
originally presented in the Application and Memorial. Accordingly, the Court, after consulting
the Parties, in its Order of March 26th, 1948, maintained the United Kingdom's Memorial, filed previously, "with statements and submissions". These
submissions included the claim for a fixed sum of
compensation.
The subsequent attitude of the Parties shows that
it was not their intention, by entering into the Special
Agreement, to preclude the Court from fixing the
amount of the compensation. In its Reply (paragraph 71) the United Kingdom Government maintained the submissions contained in paragraph 96
of its Memorial, including the claim for a fixed
amount of reparation. This claim was expressly
repeated in the final United Kingdom submissions.
In paragraph 52 of its Counter-Memorial, the Albanian Government stated that it had no knowledge
of the loss of human life and damage to ships, but
it did not contest the Court's competence to decide
this question. In the Rejoinder, paragraph 96, that
Government declared that, owing to its claim for
the dismissal of the case, it was unnecessary for it to
855422-50-10
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examine the United Kingdom's claim for reparation .
[Translation.] "It reserves the right if need be, to
discuss this point which should obviously form the
subject of an expert opinion." Having regard to
what is said above as to the previous attitude of that
Government, this statement must be considered as
an implied acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction to
decide this question.
It may be asked why the Parties, when drafting
the Special Agreement, did not expressly ask the
Court to assess the amount of the damage, but used
the words: "and is there any duty to pay compensation?" It seems probable that the explanation is to
be found in the similarity between this clause and
the corresponding clause in the second part of the
Special Agreement: "and is there any duty to give
satisfaction?"
The Albanian Government has not disputed the
competence of the Court to decide what kind of
satisfaction is due under this part of the Agreement.
The case was argued on behalf of both Parties on
the basis that this question should be decided by the
Court. In the written pleadings, the Albanian Government contended that it was entitled to apologies.
During the oral proceedings, Counsel for Albania
discussed the question whether a pecuniary sa tisfaction was due. As no damage was caused, he did
not claim any sum of money. He concluded translation]: "What we desire is the declaration of the
Court from a legal point of view."
If, however, the Court is competent to decide
what kind of satisfaction is due to Albania under the
second part of the Special Agreement, it is difficult
to see why it should lack competence to decide the
amount of compensation which is due to the United
Kingdom under the first part. The clauses used in
the Special Agreement are parallel. It cannot be
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supposed that the Parties, while drafting these
clauses in the same form, intended to give them
opposite meanings-the one as giving the Court
jurisdiction, the other as denying such jurisdiction.
As has been said above, the Security Council, in
its Resolution of April 9th, 1947, undoubtedly intended that the whole dispute should be decided by
the Court. If, however, the Court should limit
itself to saying that there is a duty to pay compensation without deciding what amount of compensation
is due, the dispute would not be finally decided. An
important part of it would remain unsettled. As
both Parties have repeatedly declared that they
accept the Resolution of the Security Council, such a
result would not conform with their declarations.
It would not give full effect to the Resolution, but
would leave open the possibility of a further dispute.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court has arrived
at. the conclusion that it has jurisdiction to assess the
amount of the compensation. This cannot, however, be done in the present Judgment. The Albanian Government has not yet stated which items,
if any, of the various sums claimed it contests, and
the United Kingdom Government has not submitted
its evidence with regard to them.
The Court therefore considers that further proceedings on this subject are necessary; the order and
time-limits of these proceedings will be fixed by the
Order of this date.

*

*

*

*

*

In the second part of the Special Agreement, the
following question is submitted to the Court:
(2) Has the United Kingdom under international law violated
the sovereignty of the Albanian People's Republic by reason of
the acts of the Royal Navy in Albanian waters on the 22nd
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October and on the 12th and 13th November 1946 and is there
any duty to give satisfaction?

The Court will first consider whether the sovereignty of Albania was violated by reason of the
acts of the British Navy in Albanian waters on
October 22nd, 1946.
On May 15th, 1946, the British cruisers Orion and
Superb, while passing southward through the North
Corfu Channel, were fired at by an Albanian battery
in the vicinity of Saranda. It appears from the report of the commanding naval officer dated May
29th, 1946, that the firing started when the ships had
already passed the battery, and were moving away
from it; that from 12 to 20 rounds were fired; that
the firing lasted 12 minutes and ceased only when the
ships 'vere out of range; but that the ships were not
hit although there were a number of "shorts" and of
"overs". An Albanian note of May 21st states that
' the Coastal Commander ordered a few shots to be
fired in the direction of the ships "in accordance with
a General Order founded on international law".
The United Kingdom Government at once protested to the Albanian Government, stating that innocent passage through straits is a right recognized
by international law. There ensued a diplomatic
correspondence in which the Albanian Government
asserted that foreign warships and merchant vessels
had no right to pass through Albanian territorial
waters without prior notification to, and the permission of, the Albanian authorities. This view was
put into effect by a communication of the Albanian
Chief of Staff, dated May 17th, 1946, which purported to subject the passage of foreign warships and
merchant vessels in Albanian territorial waters to
previous notification to and authorization by the
Albanian Government. The diplomatic correspondence continued, and culminated in a United Kingdom
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note of August 2nd, 1946, in which the United Kingdom Government maintained its view with regard to
the right of innocent passage through straits forming
routes for international maritime traffic between two
parts of the high seas. The note ended with the
warning that if Albanian coastal batteries in the
future opened fire on any British warship passing
through the Corfu Channel, the fire would be
returned.
The contents of this note were, on August 1st,
communicated by the British Admiralty to the
Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, with the instruction that he should refrain from using the
Channel until the note had been presented to the
Albanian Government. On August lOth, he received from the Admiralty the following telegram:
"The Albanian·s have now received the note. North
Corfu Strait may now be used by ships of your fleet,
but only when essential and with armament in fore
and aft position. If coastal guns fire at ships passing
through the Strait, ships should fire back." On
September 21st, the following telegram was sent by
the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean: "Establishment of diplomatic relations with
Albania is again under consideration by His Majesty's
Government who wish to know whether the Albanian
Government have learnt to behave themselves. Information is requested whether any ships under your
command have passed through the North Corfu
Strait since August and, if not, whether you intend
them to do so shortly." The Commander-in-Chief
answered the next day that his ships had not done
so yet, but that it was his intention that Mauritius
and Leander and two destroyers should do so when
they departed from Corfu on October 22nd.
It was in such circumstances that these two
cruisers together with the destroyers Saumarez and
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Volage were sent through the North Corfu Strait on
that date.
The Court will now consider the Albanian contention that the United Kingdom Government violated Albanian sovereignty by sending the warships
through this Strait without the previous authorization of the Albanian Government.
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with international custom
that States in time of peace have a right to send their
warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without
the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless other"'ise prescribed in an international convention, there
is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage
through straits in time of peace.
The Albanian Government does not dispute that
the North Corfu Channel is a strait in the geographical sense; but it denies that this Channel belongs to
the class of international highways through which
a right of passage exists, on the grounds that it is
only of secondary importance and not even a necessary route between two parts of the high seas, and
that it is used almost exclusively for local traffic to
and from the ports of Corfu and Saranda.
It may be asked whether the test is to be found in
the volume of traffic passing through the Strait or in
its greater or lesser importance for international
navigation. But in the opinion of the Court the
decisive criterion is rather its geographical situation
as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact
of its being used for in tern a tional navigation. Nor
can it be decisive that this Strait is not a necessary
route between two parts of the high seas, but only
an alternative ·passage between the lEgean and the
Adriatic Seas. It has nevertheless been a useful

143
route for international mar1t1me traffic. In this
respect, the Agent of the United Kingdom Government gave the Court the following information relating to the period from April 1st, 1936, to December
31st, 1937: "The following is the total number of
ships putting in at the Port of Corfu ·after passing
through or just before passing through the Channel.
During the period of one year nine months, the total
number of ships was 2,884. The flags of the ships
are Greek, Italian, Roumanian, Yugoslav, French,
Albanian and British. Clearly, very small vessels
are included, as the entries for Albanian vessels are
high, and of course one vessel may make several
journeys, but 2,884 ships for a reriod of one year nine
months is quite a large figure. These figures relate
to vessels visited by the Customs at Corfu and so do
not include the large number of vessels which went
through the Strait without calling at Corfu at all."
There were also regular sailings through the Strait
by Greek vessels three times weekly, by a British
ship fortnightly, and by two Yugoslav vessels weekly
and by two others fortnightly. The Court is further
informed that the British Navy has regularly used
this Channel for eighty years or more, and that it has
also been used by the navies of other States.
One fact of particular importance is that the North
Corfu Channel constitutes a frontier between Albania
and Greece, that a part of it is wholly within the
terri to rial waters of these States, and that the Strait
is of special importance to Greece by reason of the
traffic to and from the port of Corfu.
Having regard to these various considerations, the
Court has arrived at the conclusion that the North
Corfu Channel should be considered as belonging to
the class of international highways through which
passage cannot be prohibited by a coastal State in
time of peace.
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On the other hand, it is a fact that the two coastal
States did not maintain normal relations, that
Greece had made territorial claims precisely with
regard to a part of Albanian territory bordering on
the Channel,. that Greece had declared that she considered herself technically in a state of war with
Albania, and that Albania, invoking the danger of
Greek incursions, had considered it necessary to take
certain measures of vigilance in this region. The
Court is of opinion that Albania, in view of these
exceptional circumstances, would have been justified
in issuing regulations in respect of the passage of
\varships through the Strait, but not in prohibiting
such passage or in subjecting it to the requirement,
of special authorization.
For these reasons the Court is unable to accept the
Albanian contention that the Government of the
United Kingdom has violated Albanian sovereignty
by sending the warships through the Strait without
having obtained the previous authorization of the
Albanian Government.
In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the more general question, much debated by
the Parties, whether States under international law
has a right to send warships in time of peace through
territorial waters not included in a strait.
The Albanian Government has further contended
that the sovereignty of Albania was violated because
the passage of the British warships on October 22nd,
1946, was not an innocent passage. The reasons
advanced in support of this contention may be
summed up as follows: The passage was not an
ordinary passage, but a political mission; the ships
were manoeuvring and sailing in diamond combat
formation with soldiers on board; the position of
the guns was not consistent with innocent passage;
the vessels passed with crews at action stations; the
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number of the ships and their armament surpassed
what was necessary in order to attain their object
and showed an intention to intimidate and not merely
to pass; the ships had received orders to observe and
report upon the coastal defences and this order was
carried out.
It is shown by the Admiralty telegram of September 21st, cited above, and admitted by the United
Kingdom Agent, that the object of sending the warships through the Strait was not only to carry out a
passage for purposes of navigation, but also to test
Albania's attitude. As mentioned above, the Albanian Government, on May 15th, 1946, tried to
impose by means of gunfire its view with · regard to
the passage. As the exchange of diplomatic notes
did not lead to any clarification, the Government of
the United Kingdom wanted to ascertain by other
means whether the Albanian Government would
maintain its illegal attitude and again impose its
view by firing at passing ships. The legality of this
measure taken by the Government of the United
~ingdom cannot be disputed, provided that it was
carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of international law. The "mission" was
designed to affirm a right which had been unjustly
denied. The Government of the United Kingdom
was not bound to abstain from exercising its right
of passage, which the Albanian Government had
illegally denied.
If remains, therefore, to consider whether the
manner in which the passage was carried out was consistent with the principle of innocent passage and to
examine the various contentions of the Albanian
Government in so far as they appear to be relevant.
When the Albanian coastguards at St. George's
Monastery reported that the British warships were
sailing in combat formation and were manoeuvring,
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they must have been under a misapprehension . It
is shown by the evidence that the ships were not
proceeding in combat formation, but in line, one after
the other, and that they were not manoeuvring until
after the first explosion. Their movements thereafter
were due to the explosions and were made necessary
in order to save human life and the mined ships. It
is shown by the evidence of witnesses that the contention that soldiers were on board must be due to a
misunderstanding probably arising from the fact that
the two cruisers carried their usual detachment of
marines.
It is known from the above-mentioned order issued
by the British Admiralty on August lOth, 1946, that
ships, when using the North Corfu Strait, must pass
with arman1ent in fore and aft position. That this
order was carried out during the passage on October 22nd is stated by the Commander-in-Chief,
Mediterranean, in a telegram of October 26th to the
Admiralty. The guns were, he reported, "trained
fore and aft, which is their normal position at sea in
peace time, and were not loaded". It is confirmed.
by the commanders of Saumarez and Volage that the
guns were in this position before the explosions. The
navigating officer on board Mauritius explained that
all guns on that cruiser were in their normal stowage
position. The main guns were in the line of the ship,
and the anti-aircraft guns were pointing outwards
and up into the air, which is the normal position of
these guns on a cruiser both in harbour and at sea.
In the light of this evidence, the Court cannot accept
the Albanian contention that the position of the guns
was inconsistent with the rules of innocent passage.
In the above-mentioned telegram of October 26th,
the Commander-in-Chief reported that the passage
"was made with ships at action stations in order that
they might be able to retaliate quickly if fired upon
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again" . In view of the firing from the Albanian
battery on May 15th, this measure of precaution
cannot, in itself, be regarded as unreasonable. But
four warships-two cruisers and two destroyerspassed in this manner, with crews at action stations,
ready to retaliate quickly if fired upon. They passed
one after another through this narrow channel, close
to the Albanian coast, at a time of political tension in
this region. The intention must have been, not only
to test Albania's attitude, but at the same time to
demonstrate such force that she would abstain from
firing again on passing ships. Having regard, however, to all the circumstances of the case, as described above, the Court is unable to characterize these measures taken by the United Kingdom
authorities as a violation of Albania's sovereignty.
The Admiralty Chart, Annex 21 to the Memorial,
shows that coastal defences in the Saranda region had
been observed and reported. In a report of the commander of Volage, dated October 23rd, 1946-a report relating to the passage on the 22nd-i t is stated:
"The most was made of the opportunities to study
Albanian defences at close range. These included,
with reference to XCU . . . . "-and he then gives a
description of some coastal defences.
In accordance with Article 49 of the Statute of the
Court and Article 54 of its Rules, the Court requested
the United Kingdom Agent to produce the documents referred to as XCU for the use of the Court.
Those documents were not produced, the Agent
pleading naval secrecy; and the United Kingdom
witnesses declined to answer questions relating to
them. It is not therefore possible to know the real
content of these naval orders. The Court cannot,
however, draw from this refusal to produce the orders
any conclusions differing from those to which the
actual events gave rise. The United Kingdom Agent
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stated that the instructions in these orders related
solely to the contingency of shots being fired from the
coast-which did not happen. If it is true, as the
commander of Voltage said in evidence, that the
orders contained information concerning certain positions from which the British warships might have
been fired at, it cannot be deduced therefrom that
the vessels had received orders to reconnoitre Albanian coastal defences. Lastly, as the Court has
to judge of the innocent nature of the passage, it
cannot remain indifferent to the fact that, though
two warships struck mines, there was no reaction,
either on their part or on that of the cruisers that
accompanied them.
With regard to the observations of coastal defences
made after the explosions, these were justified by the
fact that two ships had just been blown up and that,
in this critical situation, their commanders might fear
that they would be fired on from the coast, as on
May 15th.
Having thus examined the various contentions of
the Albanian Government in so far as they appear
to be relevant, the Court has arrived at the conclusion
that the United Kingdom did not violate the sovereignty of Albania by reason of the acts of the British
Navy in Albanian waters on October 22nd, 1946.

*

*

*

*

*

In addition to the passage of the United Kingdom
warships on October 22nd, 1946, the second question
in the Special Agreement relates to the acts of the
Royal Navy in Albanian waters on November 12th
and 13th, 1946. This is the minesweeping operation
called "Operation Retail" by the Parties during the
proceedings. This name will be used in the present
Judgment.
After the explosions of October 22nd, the United
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Kingdom Government sent a note to the Albanian
Government, in which it announced its intention to
sweep the Corfu Channel shortly. The Albanian
reply, which was received in London on October 31st,
stated that the Albanian Government would not give
its consent to this unless the operation in question
took place outside Albanian territorial waters. Meanwhile, at the United Kingdom Governments request,
the International Centre Mine Clearance Board decided, in a resolution of November 1st, 1946, that
there should be a further sweep of the Channel, subject to Albania'$ consent. The United Kingdom
Government having informed the Albanian Government, in a communication of November lOth, that
the proposed sweep would take place on November
12th, the Albanian Government replied on the 11th,
protesting against this "unilateral decision of His
Majesty's Government". It said it did not consider
it inconvenient that the British fleet should undertake
the sweeping of the channel of navigation, but added
that, before sweeping was carried out, it considered
it indispensable to decide what area of the sea should
be deemed to constitute this channel, and proposed
the establishment of a Mixed Commission for the
purpose. It ended by saying that any sweeping
undertaken without the consent of the Albanian
Government outside the channel thus constituted,
i.e., inside Albanian terri to rial waters where foreign
warships have no reason to sail, could only be considered as a aeliberate violation of Albanian territory
and sovereignty.
After this exchange of notes, "Operation Retail"
took place on November 12th and 13th. Commander
Mestre, of the French Navy, was asked to attend as
observer, and was present at the sweep on November
13th. The operation was carried out under the protection of an important covering force composed of
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an aircraft carrier, cruisers and other war vessels .
This covering force remained throughout the operation at a certain distance to the west of the Channel,
except for the frigate St. Bride's Bay, which was
stationed in the Channel south-east of Cape Kiephali.
The sweep began in the morning of November 13th,
at about 9 o'clock, and ended in the afternoon near
nightfall. The area swept was Albanian territorial
waters, and within the limits of the channel previously swept.
The United Kingdom Government does not dispute that "Operation Retail" was carried out against
the clearly expressed wish of the Albanian Government. It recognizes that the operation had not
the consent of the international mine clearance
organizations, that it could not be justified as the
exercise of a right of innocent passage, and lastly
that, in principle, international law does not allow
a State to assemble a large number of warships in
the territorial waters of another State and to carry
out minesweeping in those waters. The United
Kingdom Government states that the operation was
one of extreme urgency, and that it ~onsidered itself
entitled to carry it out without anybody's consent.
The United Kingdom Government put forward
two reasons in justification. First, the Agreement
of November 22nd, 1945, signed by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet
Union and the United States of America, authorizing regional mine clearance organizations, such as
the Mediterranean Zone Board, to divide the sectors
in their respective zones amongst the States concerned "for sweeping. Relying on the circumstance
that the Corfu Channel was in the sector allotted to
Greece by the Mediterranean Zone Board on November 5th, i.e., before the signing of the above-mentioned Agreement, the United Kingdom Government
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put forward a permission given by the Hellenic Government to resweep the navigable channel.
1,he Court does not consider this argument
. .
COnVInCing.
It must be noted that, as the United Kingdom
Government admits, the need for resweeping the
Channel was not under consideration in November
1945; for previous sweeps in 1944 and 1945 were
considered as having effected complete safety. As a
consequence, the allocation of the sector in question
to Greece, and, therefore, the permission of the
Hellenic Government which is relied on, were both
of them merely nominal. It is also to be remarked
that Alb~nia was not consulted regarding the allocation to Greece of the sector in question, despite the
fact that the Channel passed through Albanian
terri to rial waters.
But, in fact, the explosions of October 22nd, 1946,
in a channel declared safe for navigation, and one
which the United Kingdom Government, more than
any other government, had reason to consider safe,
raised quite a different problem from that of a routine
sweep carried out under the orders of the mineclearance organizations. These explosions were suspicious; they raised a question of responsibility.
Accordingly, this was the ground on which the
United Kingdom Government chose to establish its
main line of defence. According to that Government, the corpora delicti must be secured as quickly
as possible, for fear they should be taken away,
without leaving traces, by the authors of the minelaying or by the Albanian authorities. This justification took two distinct forms in the United Kingdom Government's arguments. It was presented
first as a new and special application of the theory of
intervention, by means of which the State intervening would secure possession of evidence in the
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territory of another State, in order to submit it to
an international tribunal and thus facilitate its task.
The Court cannot accept such a line of defence.
The Court can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force,
such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious
abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present
defects in in tern a tional organization, find a place in
international law. Intervention is perhaps still less
admissible in the particular form it would take here;
for, from the nature of things, it would be reserved
for the most powerful States, and might easily lead
to perverting the adminstra tion of in tern a tional
justice itself.
The United Kingdom Agent, in his speech in reply,
has further classified "Operation Retail" among
methods of self-protection or self-help. The Court
cannot accept this defence either. Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is
an essential foundation of in tern a tional relations.
The Court recognizes that the Albanian Government's complete failure to carry out its duties after
the explosions, and the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are extenuating circumstances for the
action of the United Kingdom Government. But
to ensure respect for international law, of which it
is the organ, the Court must declare that the action
of the British Navy constituted a violation of
Albanian sovereignty.
This declaration is in accordance with the request
made by Albania through her Counsel, and is in
itself appropriate satisfaction.
The method of carrying out "Operation Retail"
has also been criticized by the Albanian Government,
the main ground of complaint bei'ng that the United
Kingdom, on that occasion, made use of an unnecessarily large display of force, out of proportion to
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the requirements of the sweep . The Court thinks
that this criticism is not justified . It does not consider that the action of the British Navy was a
demonstration of force for the purpose of exercising
political pressure on Albania. The responsible naval
commander, who kept his ships at a distance from
the coast, cannot be reproached for having employed
an important covering force in a region where twice
within a few months his ships had been the object
of serious outrages.
For these reasons, the Court, on the first question
put by the Special Agreement of March 25th, 1948,
by eleven votes to five,
Gives judgment that the People's Republic of
Albania is responsible under international law for the
explosions which occurred on October 22nd, 1946, in
Albanian waters, and for the damage and loss of
human life that resulted therefrom; and by ten votes
to six,
Reserves for further consideration the assessment
of the amount of compensation and regulates the
procedure on this subject by an Order dated this day;
On the second question put by the Special Agreement of March 25th, 1948, by fourteen vo~es to two,
Gives judgment that the United Kingdom did not
violate the sovereignty of the People's Republic of
Albania by reason of the acts of the British Navy in
Albanian waters on October 22nd, 1946; and unanimously
·
Gives judgment that by reason of the acts of the
British Navy in Albanian waters in the course of the
Operation of November 12th and 13th, 1946, the
United Kingdom violated the sovereignty of the
People's Republic of Albania, and that this declaration by the Court constitutes in itself appropriate
satisfaction.
Done in French and English, the French text being
855422-50-11
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authorative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this
ninth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and
forty-nine, in three copies, one of which will be
placed in the archives of the Court and the others
transmitted to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of
the People's Republic of Albania respectively.
(Signed)

J. G.

GuERRERO,

Acting President.
(Signed) E. HAMBRO,
Registrar.
Judge Basdevant, President of the Court, whilst
accepting the whole of the operative part of the
Judgment, feels bound to state that he cannot accept
the reasons given by the Court in support of its jurisdiction to assess the amount of compensation, other
reasons being in his opinion more decisive.
Judge Zoricic declares that he is unable to~ agree
either with the operative clause or with the reasons
for the Judgment in the part relating to Albania's
responsibility; the arguments submitted, and the
facts established are not such as to convince him that
the Albanian Government was, or ought to have
been, aware, before November 13th, 1946, of the
existence of the minefield discovered on that date.
On the one hand, the attitude adopted by a government when confronted by certain facts varies according to the circumstances, to its mentality, to the
means at its disposal and to its experience in the
conduct of public affairs. But it has not been contested that, in 1946, Albania had a new Government
possessing no experience in international practice.
It is therefore difficult to draw any inferences whatever from its attitude. Again, the conclusion of the
Experts that the operation of laying the mines must
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have been seen is subject to an express reservation:
it Tvvould be necessary to assume the realization of
several conditions, in particular the maintenance of
normal look-out posts at .Cape Kiephali, Denta Point
and San Giorgio Monastery, and the existence of
normal weather conditions at the date. But the
Court knows neither the date on which the mines
were laid nor the weather conditions prevailing on
that date. Furthermore, no proof has been furnished
of the presence of a look-out post on Denta Point,
though that, according to the Experts, would have
been the only post which would necessarily have
observed the minelaying. On the other hand, the
remaining posts would merely have been able to observe the passage of the ships, and there is no evidence to show that they ought to have concluded
that the ships were going to lay mines. According
to the Experts, these posts could neither have seen
nor heard the minelaying, because the San Giorgio
Monastery was 2,000 m. from the nearest mine and
Cape Kiephali was several kilometres away from it.
As a result, the Court is confronted with suspicions,
conjectures and presumptions, the foundations for
which, in Judge Zoricic' s view, are too uncertain to
justify him in imputing to a State the responsibility
for a grave delinquency in international law.
Judge Alvarez, whilst concurring in the Judgment
of the Court, has availed himself of the right conferred on him by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the Judgment a statement of his individual
op1n1on.
Judges Winiarski, Badawi Pasha, Krylov and
Azevedo, and Judge ad hoc Ecer, declaring that they
are unable to concur in the Judgment of the Court,
have availed themselves of the right conferred on
them by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to
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the Judgment statements of their dissenting opinions.
[Initialed] J. G. G.
[Initialed] E. H.
[Individual and dissentirlg opinions omitted.]

2. United States Laws and Regulations
A. HARBORS CLoSED To FoREIGN VEsSELS

NoTE. By an Act of 15 May 1820 (3 Stat. 597) it was made unlawful for a
period of two years "for any foreign armed vessels to enter any harbour belonging to the United States, excepting only those of Portland, Boston, New
London, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Smithville, in North Carolina,
Charleston, and Mobile; unless when such vessels shall be forced in by distress,
by the dangers of the sea, or by being pursued by an enemy, and be unable to
make any of the ports above mentioned." The President was given authority
to employ such part of the land and naval forces of the United States or the
militia thereof as he might deem necessary to enforce these provisions.
A report of 20 February 1904 by the General Board of the Navy, approved
by the Secretary of the Navy, stated,
"The General Board is of the opinion that with the exception of the belownamed ports, no restrictions should be placed on the visits of foreign men-of-war
or other public vessels, either as to number or period of stay, in ports within the
United States or under their control; neither should it be required that previous
permission must be obtained.
"The General Board is further of the opinion that before visiting any of tlte
following-named ports all foreign men-of-war or public vessels should be required to ask permission from the Secretary of theN avy, through their respective
Ministers, and the State Department:
"Tortugas, Florida.
"Great Harbor, Culebra.
"Guantanamo, Cuba.
"Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
"Guam.
"Subig Bay, Philippine Islands.
"It is, of course, understood that any -foreign vessel, before entering the
actual limits of a navy-yard in any port of the United States, would first apply
for permission" [3 Laws Relating to the Navy (1945), p. 1865].
This report was transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary
of State, who by a circular of 2 March 1904 instructed the diplomatic officers
of the United States to communicate the report to the governments to which
they were accredited, "with a view to indicate the present policy of this Government regarding the visits of foreign men-of-war to the ports of the United States
or those under the control of this Government." In a supplemental report of
28 April 1904, also approved by the Secretary of the Navy, the General Board
recommended that the ports and anchorages of the Kiska Islands be added to the
list. This report was likewise transmitted by the Secretary of the Navy to the
Secretary of State, who by a circular of 30 April 1904 instructed the diplomatic
officers of the United States to inform the governments to which they were

